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FEATURE

ARTICLE

Assessing Hospital Cooperation
Laws
by James F Blumstein
Introduction

sive dealing arrangements, 9 mergers and acquisitions that adversely affect competition, 0 unfair or deceptive practices with a significant impact on competition," and discriminatory pricing that lessens competition.' 2 Antitrust laws
promote competition in order to achieve an effi-

How to control health care costs while
preserving the quality of care has been the focal
point of much health policy discussion at the federal and state level for many years and will doubtless continue to be of importance in the future. cient allocation of resources '1 goods and
Philosophically and historically, there has been services should be available to consumers at the
debate as to the role of market forces and com- lowest price for a given quality level.
petition in allocating resources in the health care
In something of a rejection of market-oriindustry. Traditionally, many analysts have ented initiatives and a throwback to the tradiviewed the health care arena as inhospitable to tional regulatory approach, a number of states
the functioning of the economic marketplace. For recently have enacted legislation that authorizes
them, cooperation among health care providers hospitals or health care providers to enter into
coupled with regulation is an appropriate ap- cooperative agreements. In the absence of such
proach for achieving economic efficiency.' More legislation, cooperative agreements among comrecently, evidence of normal competitive behav- petitors would
be subject to federal and state
ior in the health care industry2 has led many antitrust laws. 4 While these cooperation laws
policymakers and analysts to conclude that a dose enable cooperative efforts among health care proof competition is what the doctor should order.' viders, 5 they permit such activity only under
And, since "[a]ntitrust law is the virtual engine certain circumstances. The statutes establish
of the market paradigm," 4 market-oriented, pro- elaborate schemes for securing approval, weighcompetitive policies contemplate an appropriate ing, among other factors, the possible adverse
role for antitrust enforcement to assure a free and impact of cooperative conduct on competition.
competitive marketplace.'
The primary purpose of
antitrust legislation is to promote
competition in the market place in
Mr. Blum'stein is a Professor of Law at Vanderbilt Univerorder to achieve economic effisity Law chool and an Adjunct Professorof Health Law at
ciency and thereby to improve the
Dartmouth Medical School. ProfessorBlumstein is also an
well being of consumers. Federal
elected member of the Institute of Medicine. He received a
antitrust legislation prohibits conB.A. and M.A. in economics, and an LL.B. from Yale Unispiracies to restrain trade,' moversity, w here he was an editor of the Yale Law Journal.
nopolization and attempts to monopolize,8 anticompetitive exclu98 * Loyola Consumer Law Reporter
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State administrators, typically health departments, are allowed to balance the benefits
claimed to be achieved through cooperative
agreements against possible anticompetitive results. 16

This paper examines the nature of the
health care market and its evolution, explains the
legal basis for state conferral of antitrust immunity for hospital cooperative conduct, reviews
federal antitrust hospital industry enforcement
guidelines, and summarizes the hospital cooperation laws. The paper concludes with a discussion of the likely impact of the hospital cooperation laws on the consumer.
The changing hospital and health care
market
The nature of competition in the health
care field and among hospitals is changing. Because of the prevalence of nearly complete thirdparty insurance coverage for hospital services,
there was very little price competition until the
early 1980s. 7 Because of legislative changes that
have encouraged competition and cost control
and because of changes in the way health care
services are being purchased, price competition
exists and has been demonstrated in some areas
of the country and seems to have emerged in
many more markets in the past few years. Studies regarding price competition have focused on
California because data are available and a high
percentage of the population is covered by insurers who contract competitively with providers. Since ninety millionAmericans are covered
by HMOs and discount medical networks, '"
price competition is likely to be an important
market feature in other parts of the country.

1995-1996

Historical background
Historically, influenced by the institutional structure and environment in which they
functioned, hospitals and the markets in which
they operate have behaved in a somewhat different manner from other industries and their markets.' 9 Until recently, three participants in the
hospital market - physicians, patients, and hospitals - operated in an environment in which
price was not an overriding consideration; insurance paid for treatment considered appropriate by the physician and paid at a price set by the
providers - the physicians and hospitals. 20
Among the participants in the market, physicians have been the most influential; 2' because
of their experience and training, they have much
more specialized knowledge and expertise than
23
patients. 22 The professional dominance model
24
has resulted from (and in turn has reinforced)
this asymmetry of information. 25 Under the traditional professional paradigm, patients rely on
the recommendations of their physician. With
the prevalence of third-party insurance for hospital stays, patients could receive hospital services for relatively small out-of-pocket payments. 26 Because of physicians' traditional ability to channel patients, hospitals have been dependent on physicians to admit patients to their
facilities.27 Competition among hospitals has
focused on attracting referrals of patients by physicians. In that type of competitive environment,
emphasis among competitor hospitals is on the
wishes of physicians, and neither the hospital nor
the physician in such circumstances has much
of an incentive to be responsive to considerations
of cost. This general picture is still true in many
parts of the United States; in some areas, however, payers - increasingly important, increas-

Feature Articles * 99

ingly cost-conscious, and increasingly active
participants in the market - exert their influence and change the hospital and the health care
market.28
Normally, increased competition in a
market can be expected to lead to greater efficiency and lower prices. 29 Early studies on the
effects of hospital competition led to the seemingly paradoxical conclusion that increased competition led to higher prices. 3° This led to the
familiar "medical arms race" hypothesis, where
purchases of expensive equipment led to similar
purchases by other institutions without respect
to cost effectiveness. 3' The tradition of professional dominance, the predominance of thirdparty insurance, and the overall lack of incentives for cost consciousness meant that cost considerations were not an issue for competitive
contesting among hospitals. Competition among
hospitals, therefore, did not focus on price but
rather on other, non-price dimensions, as in other
industries (such as heavily regulated industries)
where the terms of competition are constrained.
Frequently, competitive activity was directed to
providing costly amenities for patients and sophisticated equipment for physicians (with the
necessary staff required to operate the equipment).32 This resulted in increased overhead for
each institution and in the unwarranted duplication of services in the marketplace.33
The syllogism for competitive success was
quite straightforward. Hospitals succeeded by
filling beds. Filled beds derived from referrals,
since patients traditionally have typically been
admitted to a hospital by a physician. Physicians
controlled patient flow through control of patient
referrals. Hospitals, therefore, competed among
themselves for patients by vying for the affiliation of local physicians;' to gain physician af100 o Loyola Consumer Law Reporter

filiations, hospitals provided expensive specialized clinical services.35 Given the structure of
the marketplace, and the existing structure of
incentives, hospitals in competitive markets had
higher costs than those without competitors. Part
of the reason for this phenomenon, apparently,
was the inappropriate duplication of services.36
"Hospitals in monopolistic positions within their
local area produce[d] their services at significantly lower costs than hospitals in more competitive environments. 37 With payments to
hospitals reflecting a cost-based system, in which
hospitals were reimbursed for their legitimate
expenditures (including capital outlays), there
was little incentive for any relevant
decisionmaker to take costs into consideration.
As a result, the hospital market seemed38 to function differently from other markets - greater
competition correlated with higher rather than
lower prices.39
Recent market changes
Legislative changes' and insurer and employer attention to health care costs4 have
changed the dynamic of the health care industry
in some parts of the country. This suggests that
when the health care marketplace is restructured
to reflect incentives like other markets, health
care participants and markets behave in like fashion.
In 1982, California enacted legislation (effective in 1983) that allowed health insurance
plans (private third parties and the state Medicaid program) to contract selectively with health
care providers.42 This enabled private insurance
plans and Medi-Cal (California's Medicaid program) to channel their beneficiaries to selected
providers in exchange for price and other con-
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cessions. This change introduced price competi- low-competition markets.53 In the period from
tion in the California health care market as in- 1983 to 1988, high HMO market penetration
surance plans and Medi-Cal bargained with hos- stimulated more price competitive behavior on
pitals and other providers.4 3 In 1983, federal leg- the part of traditional health insurers. When such
islation established the prospective payment sys- insurers were permitted to contract with hospitem ("PPS") for hospitals treating Medicare pa- tals for discounts, they did so, and that led to a
54
tients.' Under PPS, hospitals are paid a fixed reduction in costs.
fee for a range of defined services called diagThus, there is reason to think that in com45
nosis-related groups ("DRGs").
Finally, petitive hospital markets, when appropriately
HMOs 4 and PPOs,47 entities which bargain for structured, the standard economic assumption
discounts from hospitals, grew rapidly.48 With that competition lowers prices or decreases the
the introduction of
price/cost margin is
cost-conscious paytrue. 5 A payerThe
influence
of
payors
is
ers into the health
driven market is
care field, incentives typical in the traditional
characterized by the
shifted. As a result,
presence of purchasprice competition as marketplace, as payors
ers who are motiwell as quality comvated and capable56
determine
the
levels
(quantity
petition began to
price shoppers.57
emerge. 49
The influence of
and quality) of services that
Data from
payors is typical in
1980 through 1985 will be purchased.
the traditional marshow that in Califorketplace, as payors
nia the new payment policies, and the concomi- determine the levels (quantity and quality) of sertant shift in economic incentives for participants vices that will be purchased. This reflects a growin the marketplace, dramatically reduced the rate ing influence of market-driven behavior and a
of increase in total hospital costs and revenues parallel erosion of the professional model, in
and caused a shift to less expensive outpatient which issues of quality and style of practice are
services.50 About 80 percent of the population typically decisions of the professional practitioof California is covered either by Medicare (and ners who act (presumably in a fiduciary capacis therefore subject to DRGs) or managed care ity) on behalf of their patients (but without in58
organizations (with their careful attention to centives for constraining costs).
costs); and thus hospitals now have strong inUnderstanding how hospital markets
centives to reduce costs.5 I The 1983-85 rate of function and how hospitals compete clearly has
growth of hospital costs was lower than the 1980- implications for antitrust policies. If hospitals
82 rate for all categories except for out-patient compete primarily in non-price ways, intensifyservices; 5 2 for hospitals in highly competitive ing competition will very likely increase conareas, total inpatient costs (adjusted for inflation) sumer costs and prices.59 However, if hospitals
declined by 11.3 percent while remaining flat in can be induced to compete even partially by
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price, maintaining potentially competitive markets is important so that consumers may realize
the benefits of price competition.' Antitrust
enforcement will require sensitivity to distinctions between pro and anticompetitive combinations. 6' It seems that existing antitrust doctrine
is well equipped to allow the drawing of those
distinctions,62 and recent evidence suggests that
the federal antitrust enforcement officials are
aware of and sensitive to these concerns.63
The conferral of state immunity
The state-enacted hospital cooperation
laws, which exempt certain cooperative agreements among hospitals or health care providers
from federal antitrust laws, are based on the
Parker v. Brown' state-action immunity doctrine. Although in enacting the antitrust laws,
Congress has exercised its constitutional commerce power to the maximum; 65 in Parker,the
Supreme Court deferred to federalism' and established a form of "inverse preemption."67 By
appropriate legislative and regulatory action, a
state can immunize the conduct of private parties from the application of the federal antitrust
laws. Thus, federal antitrust law is "subject to
supersession by state regulatory programs" '68 that
substitute regulation for competition, provided
that the state clearly articulates its policy and
69
actively supervises it.
Parkerv. Brown7" concerned an antitrust
challenge to California's Raisin Proration Program, which authorized the state to appropriate
a portion of each producer's output in order to
stabilize raisin prices. This was a clear effort by
the state to restrict competition among raisin
growers7 , yet the Court found no violation of
the Sherman Act. The Court reasoned that the
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Sherman Act prohibited individual action, not
state action. 72 Even though the California program would have violated the antitrust laws "if
it were organized and made effective solely" by
collective action of "private persons," the
Sherman Act does not "restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed by its
legislature"73 and therefore does not apply "to
anticompetitive restraints imposed by the States
74
'as an act of government.'
In California Liquor Dealers Ass'n v.
MidcalAluminum, Inc.,7 the Court clarified the
requirements for a state to confer antitrust immunity successfully on a private party.76 Two
standards must be satisfied. First, the challenged
restraint must be clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy; 77 in this regard,
a state policy that permits but does not compel
anticompetitive conduct can be considered
"clearly articulated. '78 Second, the policy must
be actively supervised by the state itself.79 Actual' and not just potential" supervision by the
state is required. 82 Because, with respect to private conduct, "there is a real danger that [the
private party] is acting to further [its] own interests, rather than the governmental interests of the
State, 83 the state must "exercise ultimate control over the challenged anticompetitive conduct ....The mere presence of some state involvement or monitoring does not suffice."84
Thus, passive ratification of private
anticompetitive conduct will not suffice to establish Parker immunity. Parker"shelter[s] only
the particular anticompetitive acts of private parties that, in the judgment of the State, actually
further state regulatory policies."85 Further, and
of fundamental importance, those specific acts
must be subject to "ongoing regulation by the
State. 86 The government's duty to supervise
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persists if the conferral of immunity is to be effective. Active supervision must be an ongoing
process, not a momentary event.
Parkerimmunity is "disfavored. 87 To satisfy the requirements of Parker,"[s]tates must
accept political responsibility for actions they intend to undertake."88 A state's decision to substitute a regime of regulation for the national
policy of competition as reflected in the federal
antitrust laws must be "implemented in its specific details"8 9 to assure
that
the
"anticompetitive

have enacted laws to immunize behavior by hospitals or health care providers that otherwise
95
might be subject to federal antitrust scrutiny.
These laws allow cooperative agreements among
hospitals or health care providers based on the
Parker v. Brown96 state-action doctrine. These

statutes vary significantly in the scope of coverage and the sophistication of approach. Some
follow a standardized legislative model while
others are unique. Some have broad coverage,
others are quite limited in scope.
Although
The requirement of active
scheme is the State's
the statutes all differ
from one another
own."'9 The supervi- state supervision is to prevent
sion must not merely
(even those based on
private
parties
from
taking
be that of lip service
the
legislative
to the formalities of advantage of a state
model), Tennessee's
may be used as an
regulation, thereby
example of the prohiding inaction by the regulatory scheme for their
9
visions and proceregulating agencies. '
The requirement of own private interests.
dures frequently included in the statactive state supervision is to prevent private parties from taking ad- utes. The Tennessee statute applies to cooperavantage of a state regulatory scheme for their own tive agreements between or among two or more
hospitals regarding the sharing, allocation or reprivate interests. 92
The validity of the hospital cooperation ferral of patients, personnel, services and facililaws is likely to rest on satisfying the "active su- ties; it does not cover other health care providpervision" standard. Because the laws typi- ers. 97 There are three specific limitations on the
cally express the desire to supersede the federal scope of cooperative activity that can be apantitrust laws in pursuit of statutorily articulated proved under the terms of the statute. The statstate policy objectives, the clear articulation test ute does not authorize hospitals pursuant to a
cooperation agreement: 1) to operate as health
is probably met. 9
maintenance organizations (HMOs) without being so licensed; 2) to negotiate terms with insurState hospital cooperation laws
ers, HMOs, or PPOs otherwise prohibited under
Despite the positive effects on economic the antitrust laws; or 3) to permit referrals to probehavior and consumer benefit that the antitrust vider-owned facilities otherwise prohibited by
laws seek to promote, at least nineteen 94 states law. 98
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Hospitals may enter into agreements if the
likely benefits stemming from the agreements
outweigh any disadvantages attributable to a reduction in competition that may result. 99 Parties
to such an agreement may apply to the department of health for a certificate of public advantage and must also submit the application to the
attorney general. The attorney general and the
health department are entrusted with the active
and continuing oversight of all cooperative agreements.' ° The department of health reviews the
application and may hold a public hearing. The
department is required to give public notice and
to allow interested parties to intervene. After
consultation and agreement with the attorney
general, the department may issue a certificate
of public advantage for a cooperative agreement
if it determines that the applicants have demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that the
likely benefits resulting from the agreement outweigh any disadvantages attributable to a reduction in competition that may result.' 0'
In evaluating the benefits, the department
is required to consider whether one or more of
the following benefits may accrue: a) enhanced
quality of hospital care; b) preservation of hospital services in geographic proximity to communities traditionally so served; c) gains in cost
efficiency of services provided by the hospitals
involved; d) improvements in utilization of hospital resources; and e) avoidance of duplication
of hospital resources. Additionally the department is required to evaluate at least the following potential disadvantages: 1) the adverse impact on the ability of managed care organizations
or other providers to negotiate optimal payment
and service arrangements with hospitals and
other providers; 2) the extent of any reduction in
competition among health care providers other
104 * Loyola Consumer Law Reporter

than hospitals that is likely to result; 3) any adverse impact on patients regarding quality, availability and price of health services; and 4) the
availability of arrangements that are less restrictive to competition to achieve the benefits
02
sought.
The department of health is required to
consult with the state attorney general regarding
any potential reduction in competition, and the
state attorney general may consult with the
United States Department of Justice or the Federal Trade Commission.0 3 Provision is made for
terminating a certificate of public advantage by
the department of health or the state attorney general. I° Although the statute does not directly invoke the state-action immunity doctrine, it provides that a cooperative agreement approved
under procedures it sets forth is a lawful agreement notwithstanding' 0 5 any other provision of
law.

06

The Tennessee statute articulates a state
purpose and proposes to substitute state regulation for competition.0 7 The first part of the stateaction immunity test, requiring clear articulation
of a state policy to substitute regulation for competition, would therefore seem to be met. However, the "active supervision" requirement, which
mandates ongoing supervision by the state to
assure that governmental (not private) policies
are being pursued, 0 8 raises substantial questions.
While the attorney general and the health department are entrusted with the active and continuing oversight of cooperative agreements, there
are no procedures within the statute that require
continuing governmental supervision after the
approval process and the issuance of a certificate of public advantage. Proposed Tennessee
regulations require every holder of a certificate
of public advantage to submit quarterly reports
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and compliance certificates to the health department. The health commissioner may require
additional information and site visits."° Yet actual supervision must exist in fact, not just in
theory."' Mere passive ratification of private
decisions is not enough,"' and the unexercised
power to supervise is also insufficient" 2 to confer Parkerprotection.
In the only major action taken under hospital cooperation laws," 3 the Minnesota Commissioner of Health approved an agreement to
allow the merger of two hospital systems located
in the greater Minneapolis and Saint Paul areas. "14
The hospital systems did not fit within the DOJ/
FTC merger safety zone." 5 The Commissioner
found that the merger would result in cost savings to the users of the hospitals." 6 This was
shown through affidavits from major purchasers
of health care services in the area.' ' These affidavits indicated that through their contract negotiations with the hospitals savings had been
passed on to them." 8 Additionally, no purchasers filed negative comments regarding the
merger. I" The affidavits also gave weight to the
argument that even post-merger, the market was
still competitive. 120 Arguably,' 2 1 the existence
of the state statute allowed a merger that will
achieve cost efficiencies and that, through state
22
oversight, will pass on savings to payers.

eral Trade Commission issued joint guidelines
regarding their antitrust enforcement policies in
124
the health care field.
The 1994 guidelines currently include
nine statements on enforcement policy and analytical principles in the following areas:
1) Mergers;
2) Hospital joint ventures
involving equipment;
3) Hospital joint ventures
involving specialized services;
4) Providers' collective
provision of non-fee-related information;
5) Providers' collective
provision of fee-related information;
6) Provider participation
in exchanges of price and cost
information;
7) Joint purchasing arrangements among providers;
8) Policy on physician
network joint ventures; and
9) Analytical principles
relating to multiprovider networks.

Many of these guidelines apply to areas
that might be covered by state legislation conAntitrust guidelines for health care
cerning cooperative agreements among hospitals
One purpose of the hospital cooperation or among health care providers, depending on
laws may have been to deal with perceived prob- the scope of the particular statute. These guidelems of uneven or inappropriate application of lines and the accompanying analytical explanathe antitrust laws to hospitals or other health care tions may enable health care providers to proproviders.'" However, in response to requests ceed with various arrangements that will promote
and criticisms from providers, in 1993 and again efficiencies in the health care market with some
in 1994, the Department of Justice and the Fed- decreased risk of antitrust enforcement.
1995-1996

Feature Articles * 105

Thoughtful application of antitrust laws may be
an effective way to achieve the goals sought by
the state-action immunity laws with fewer unanticipated adverse consequences.' 25 The promulgation of these guidelines seems to have lessened the impetus for states to enact hospital cooperation laws. The increased clarity of federal
enforcement policy may enable health care providers to achieve the benefits of joint endeavors
with less hassle126 and more certainty 2 7 than utilizing the state-enacted hospital cooperation laws.
Providers will surely try first to fit within the
guidelines and only resort to the hospital cooperation laws as a second choice. That there has
been only one major use of hospital cooperation
legislation (Minnesota's) suggests that these procedures are still less attractive to hospitals than
the traditional federal antitrust review process. 128

from antitrust scrutiny. The hospital cooperation laws probably meet the clear articulation test.
The active supervision requirement poses the
nettlesome problem.
To satisfy the strictures of Parker,a state
must ensure that the policies being pursued by
private parties are those of the government. This
requires that the supervision by government be
hands-on; actual'2 9 and ongoing 30 exercise of
supervisory authority is necessary for Parker
immunity to attach.
In Tennessee, by way of example, the statute authorizes active and continuing oversight
of cooperative agreements by the department of
health and the attorney general, and the proposed
regulations require quarterly reports and allow
for additional oversight. If the health department
actually acts upon the reports and periodically
actively reviews the approved cooperative arrangements, that may be sufficient. But to
achieve Parkerimmunity, the state would have
The impact of hospital cooperation laws
on consumers
to affirmatively approve or disapprove 3' the
"specific details"' 3 2 of the "particular
A.
The hospital cooperation laws anticompetitive acts of private parties"' 3 3 to asmay have a negligible impact on consumers as
sure that the "anticompetitive scheme is the
they may be used only infrequently. There are State's own."' 34
three reasons why this may be so: first, there will
Few of the other states have statutory probe uncertainty that the state procedures will be visions for active supervision. 3 5 Because of the
sufficient to confer antitrust immunity; second, lack of statutory provisions, hospitals or health
receiving immunity may entail such significant care providers acting cooperatively with
the apstate supervision as to be costly and burdensome; proval of the state health department may neverand third, the federal guidelines may provide an theless find themselves subject to antitrust laws
alternate and more certain method to achieve the because the state supervision was not sufficiently
same end.
active. It will be difficult for parties to such
1. In order to confer immunity under the agreements to know their status with certainty.
Parker state-action immunity doctrine, a state The parties will have no control over their own
must clearly articulate its intention to displace supervision; nor will they have the ability to recompetition with regulation and must actively quire the state through the health department to
supervise the actions of the parties immunized exercise active supervision. 3 6 Because of this
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uncertainty, providers have not (and may not) they will not pursue enforcement efforts. In such
make much use of the state hospital cooperation circumstances, there is a much-reduced antitrust
laws.
risk. Even though antitrust courts are not bound
2. Even if the statute and regulations pro- by the DOJ/FFC guidelines, and private parties
vide for adequate supervision to satisfy the can bring antitrust actions, the antitrust risk is
Parkerstandards, and even if the state agencies likely to be sufficiently small so that a private
actually exercise their statutorily-conferred su- party will see no compelling reason, as a practipervisory powers, hospitals and other providers cal matter, to apply for a state's blessing by commay not utilize the state statutes because of the plying with the necessarily cumbersome and exloss of decisionmaking autonomy and the bur- pensive state procedures. As a result, applicadensome costs. The
tions for approval of
intrusiveness and the
cooperative agreetransaction costs of The intrusiveness and the
ments likely will involve situations that
complying with the
transaction
costs
of
complying
required supervision
fall outside the fedmay be greater than with the required supervision
eral guidelines and
the advantage to be
thus entail more risk
gained from the co- may be greater than the
of anticompetitive
operation agreement.
pricing and inThat is, merging a advantage to be gained from
creased costs to conservice currently of- the cooperation agreement.
sumers.
Furtherfered by two hospitals might be economically efficient for both hos- more, the DOJ/FTC guidelines provide an alterpitals. However, the costs of demonstrating the native procedure to the state process. Under the
advantages of the collective conduct, of produc- guidelines, the federal antitrust enforcement
ing on a continuing basis the reports required to agencies have promised to respond to business
show the savings and the use of the savings,"3 review or advisory opinion requests within 90
38
and of complying with site visits or any other days after all necessary information is received.1
such requirements might be greater than the sav- Thus, instead of going through the state proceings generated. It may be a Catch 22 situation: dure, the parties may prefer to utilize the federal
if the supervision is sufficient to confer immu- procedure. It is not clear which procedure will
nity, its costs might exceed the benefits to be be more time-consuming and costly. The fedgained.
eral review process has the advantage of less
3. The federal guidelines remove from uncertainty - assuring parties of the enforceDOJ/FTC antitrust enforcement scrutiny many ment decision of the federal antitrust agencies.
arrangements that the hospital cooperation laws Private antitrust actions, however, remain availmay have been intended to cover. If an agree- able. While the state procedures confer immument fits within the federal guidelines, the fed- nity if effective, there is always the risk that the
eral enforcement agencies have announced that supervision by the appropriate state agency will
1995-1996
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be inadequate to confer immunity successfully
under the Parkerstate-action doctrine.
Cooperative agreements may
B.
lead to efficiencies, but they also have the potential to be cozy arrangements for the benefit of
the participants to the detriment of payers for
health care. In most fields, competition is generally regarded as the best method of supplying
consumers with goods and services of a given
quality at the lowest price. Meaningful price
competition among health care providers stimulated by the interest of employers, unions, insurance companies and other payers in containing
health care costs is emerging in some areas of
the country. 139 Managed care entities that supervise the quality and quantity of care given their
enrollees and that, by their aggregation of patients into large groups can bargain effectively
with health care providers for reduced rates, are
becoming more widespread."4 The possibility
of effectively using market competition to restrain health care costs will be diminished or even
eliminated in some areas if states allow cooperative agreements among health care providers
to reduce the number of providers so that insufficient numbers remain for competition among
them to be effective. States must be cognizant
of this problem and not foreclose the possibility
of using competition to reduce costs by approving cooperative agreements that eliminate the
possibility of competition. 4 ' Although some
commentators assert that the health care industry is different and price competition is not suitable, 42 recent studies'43 and other reported information'" regarding the effectiveness of competition to reduce costs but maintain quality 45
would seem to counter this argument. "
Hospitals traditionally have used their insulation from price competition to cost shift that is, to charge different payers different prices.
108 9 Loyola Consumer Law Reporter

Cost shifting enabled hospitals to subsidize indigent care, specialized services, medical education, research or other worthy endeavors. Effective competition reduces the ability of hospitals to cost shift. 47 Hospital cooperation laws
may enable hospitals and other health care providers to maintain or reestablish the conditions
necessary for cost shifting."48 If this is the case,
application of the hospital cooperation laws may
mean increased costs for many payers and increased surpluses for the hospitals. These surpluses would then provide hospitals with funds
to apply elsewhere. There is a real problem of
accountability in this type of effort. The magnitude of the subsidy is blurred, and careful attention to trade-offs is difficult in this context. 49
The impact of the hospital cooperation
laws on the consumer will also depend on how
the health departments and attorneys general
evaluate the statutory benefits and disadvantages
of the cooperation agreements. Evaluation of the
statutory benefits and disadvantages will be difficult and almost any result can probably be justified. For one thing the benefits and disadvantages are not ranked in order of importance.
Additionally the statutory benefits themselves are
inherently contradictory. 50 Some benefits are
directed at increased efficiency and cost control
while others are directed at quality and geographic access. Enhancement of the quality of
care in hospitals and preservation of geographic
access to hospitals are likely to increase costs.
However, gains in cost efficiency are likely to
reduce costs or slow the rate of cost increase. It
is not clear whether the two other benefits increase or decrease costs. Improvements in utilization of hospital resources may be achieved by
consolidating under-used services that might
lower costs. Subsidizing increased utilization of
hospital resources, on the other hand, is likely to
Volume 8, number 2

increase costs. Avoiding duplication of hospital
resources may serve to increase efficiency and
reduce prices, or it may serve to increase market
power and increase prices. Since the benefits
are not prioritized, the process is highly politicized, with the health department and the attorney general possibly disagreeing on the evaluation of the overall public benefit to be achieved
by the cooperative agreement. The resolution of
competing statutory goals will take place in a
forum where the process could be tilted to favor
the highly organized and concentrated interests.
The typical statute does set a standard that
the benefits must outweigh the disadvantages by
clear and convincing evidence. This gives guidance to those applying the statute that the benefits, which ever ones are decided to be most
important, must be significantly greater than the
disadvantages. But this is a very hard standard
to apply, and judicial review is likely to be extremely deferential. On balance, it is appropriate to view these provider-cooperation statutes
with some skepticism, particularly as evidence
accrues that competition in the health care industry results in desirable outcomes when properly structured. There is a real risk of market
distortion from hidden taxation and the super15
session of federal antitrust laws. 1

savings on to the purchasers of health care. Since
this merger was in a major metropolitan area, it
is likely that significant competition remained.
The Minnesota decision was a thoughtful evaluation of costs and efficiencies and the effect of
the merger on the market. But even in that case,
a thoughtful and knowledgeable analyst has expressed skepticism about the benefits for consumers.

52

Competition is working to reduce costs
in markets where structures conducive to effective competition exist. This result will likely
expand as managed care grows. This is shown
in studies of recent data and in anecdotal newspaper coverage. Massachusetts in a short period
of time has passed California as the state with
the highest percentage of people enrolled in managed care entities.'53 Most people live in population centers which either have competitive
health care markets or potentially competitive
markets. It is clearly not desirable for state immunity laws to eliminate competition or the possibility of competition in markets where the
population is large enough to support competing
hospitals or competing managed care plans.
Even if price competition is not yet active in an
area, foreclosing the possibility eliminates the
efficiencies that may be realized in the future.
State policy makers should be extremely cautious
regarding cooperative agreements among health
Conclusion
care providers just as competitive forces are
There are insufficient data to reach a firm emerging that will rationalize the efficiency of
conclusion regarding the benefits to or effects the health care marketplace to the benefit of conon consumers of hospital or provider coopera- sumers. This is a time for prudence before retion legislation based on the actual application establishing the regulatory paradigm, based on
of these laws. The one major decision, possibly outdated data, just as newer evidence
Minnesota's decision to allow the merger of two strongly suggests the viability of and benefits
hospital systems in Minneapolis/St. Paul, was from properly structured competition and approreached after consideration of the efficiencies to priate incentives in the health care arena.
be realized and of mechanisms to pass the cost
1995-1996
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Compare Frederic J. Entin et al., Hospital Collaboration: The
Needfor anAppropriateAntitrust Policy, 29 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 107 (1994) with David L. Meyer & Charles F. (Rick)
Rule, Health Care Collaboration Does Not Require Substantive Antitrust Reform, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 169 (1994).
There is a serious question whether the goals of a regulatory
regime are (or can be, politically) confined to the achievement of economic efficiency. Cross-subsidization of preferred
services rather than economic efficiency may be the driving
force for regulation. That requires the generation and recapturing of supra-competitive returns, which in turn are dependent on and necessitate a less-than-competitive economic
environment. See James F. Blumstein, Health Care Reform
and Competing Visions of Medical Care: Antitrust and State
Provider Cooperation Legislation, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1459,
1498-1501 (1994) [hereinafter Blumstein, Competing Visions].
2 See infra text accompanying notes 42 & 43.
3

For an early discussion of the case for greater emphasis on
market-oriented policies in the health care industry, see James
F.Blumstein & FrankA. Sloan, Redefining Government's Role
in Health Care: Is a Dose of Competition What the Doctor
Should Order?, 34 VAND. L. REV. 849 (198 1).
See Blumstein, Competing Visions, supra note I, at 1482.

5 Id. at 1482-86.

James M. Klingensmith, Applying Antitrust Concepts to
the Acute Care Hospital Industry: Defining the Relevant
Market for Hospital Services, 13 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L.
153, 154(1988).

6 See

Sherman Antitrust Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988 & Supp. II
1990). See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society,
457 U.S. 332 (1982); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v.
Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
Sherman Antitrust Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988 & Supp. II
1990). See Morgenstern, M.D. v. Wilson, M.D., 29 F.3d
1291 (8th Cir. 1994).
Clayton Act § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1988). See Barr Lab., Inc. v.
Abbott Lab., 978 F.2d 98 (3rd Cir. 1992); Advanced HealthCare Services, Inc. v. Radford Community Hosp., 910 F2d
139 (4th Cir. 1990).
' 0Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988). See U.S. v. Carilion
Health System, 707 F Supp. 840 (W.D. Va. 1989); U.S. v.
Rockford Memorial Corporation, 717 F. Supp. 1251 (N.D.
II1. 1989), aft'd, 89 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 920 (1990).
"Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C.A. § 45 (1995).
See American Medical Ass'n v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 94
F.T.C. 701 (1979), affirmed as modified, 638 F.2d 443 (2d
Cir. 1980), and affirmed by an equally divided court, 452
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U.S. 678 (1982); Federal Trade Comm'n v. Indiana Fed'n of
Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
2
' Robinson-Patman Act § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1988). The
Robinson-Patman provision establishes fairness among competitors rather than economic efficiency as its primary objective. This provision has been much criticized by commentators. See Klingensmith, supra note 6, at 154-55. To the extent that state provider-cooperation laws immunize conduct
that is pro-competitive but that could violate RobinsonPatman, then economic efficiency might well be enhanced.
13See Meyer & Rule, supra note 1, at 179.
Ile federal antitrust enforcement agencies have formulated
guidelines regarding their exercise of prosecutorial discretion in administering the antitrust laws. If conduct falls within
the safety zones spelled out in those guidelines, then no enforcement action will be pursued by the agencies. See U.S.
Dept. of Justice and Federal Trade Comm'n, Statements of
Enforcement Policy and Analytical Principles Relating to
Health Care and Antitrust (Sept. 27, 1994), reprinted in 4
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 13,152 at 20,769.
'"These provider cooperation laws have been enacted under the
state-action antitrust immunity doctrine. See Parker v. Brown,
317 U.S. 341 (1943). For a discussion of the development of
this doctrine, see infra text accompanying notes 70-74. Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution,
U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2, state laws that conflict with or that
are inconsistent with federal laws are unconstitutional. See,
e.g., Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977). Under
Parker, however, federal antitrust laws do not apply to certain state and state-approved anticompetitive private conduct.
Parker thus reverses the general principle that federal laws
prevail over state laws. See Blumstein, Competing Visions,
supra note I at 1486-87. See also James F.Blumstein, Federalism and Civil Rights: Complementary and Competing
Paradigms, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1251, 1255, 1297-98 (1994).
16 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11 - 1303(d) (1994). The states
of Florida, Idaho, Kansas, Maine, Minnesota, Nebraska, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Texas, Wisconsin, and Wyoming have similar formulations based on balancing possible
benefits against anticompetitive effects. See infra Table I
(Hospital Operation Laws). In contrast to this balancing of
overall benefits against anticompetitive effects, antitrust laws
eliminate non-efficiency-based criteria from analytical consideration. See Thomas E. Kauper, The Role of Quality of
Health Care Considerations in Antitrust Analysis, 51 LAW &
CoNTEMP. PROBS. 273, 292-93 (Spring 1988) (asserting consumer welfare model of antitrust enforcement focuses "solely
on allocative and productive efficiency," and that "prevailing
antitrust standards are largely in accord with this 'consumer
welfare model"'.)
"See, e.g., Harold S. Luft et al, The Role of Specialized Clinical
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Services in Competition Among Hospitals, 23 INQUIRY 83, 93
(1986) [hereinafter Luft et al., Specialized Clinical Services]
(asserting that competition among hospitals focused on attracting physicians through the offer of specialized services
and that this type of competition led to a proliferation of clinical services and cost inflation); James C. Robinson & Harold
Luft, The Impact of Hospital Market Structure on Patient
Volume, Average Length of Stay, and the Cost of Care, 4 J.
HEALTH ECON. 333, 353-54 (1985) [hereinafter Robinson &

Luft, HospitalMarket Structure] (supporting the hypothesis
that in a cost-based mode of reimbursement greater competition is associated with higher rather than lower costs); James
C. Robinson & Harold S. Luft, Competition and the Cost of
Hospital Care, 1972 to 1982, 257 JAMA 3241, 3244 (1987)
[hereinafter Robinson & Luft, Competition and Cost] (presenting data indicating that hospital costs were substantially
higher in more competitive markets consistent with the "medical arms race" hypothesis that competition among hospitals
took the form of cost-increasing acquisition of new technology attractive to physicians and patients); J. MichealWoolley
& H.E. Frech, III, How HospitalsCompete:A Review of the
Literature,2 U. FLA. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 57,65-75 (1988-89)
[hereinafter Woolley & Frech, How HospitalsCompete] (citing many studies which generally showed under various methodologies that competitive hospital markets had higher prices);
Jack Zwanziger and Glenn A. Melnick, The Effects of Hospital Competition and the MedicarePPS Programon Hospital
Cost Behavior in California,7 J. HEALTH ECON. 301, 301-305
(1988) [hereinafter Zwanziger & Melnick, Competition and
the Medicare PPS Program] (discussing studies using data
from 1970s and early 1980s showing higher costs in competitive markets).
18 Milt Freudenheim, Doctors Are Sparring with Insurers over
Right to Join Health Networks, N.Y. TIMES, JULY 12, 1994, at
A8.
9
See Woolley & Frech, How HospitalsCompete, supra note 17,
at 58, 61; Robinson & Luft, Competition and Cost, supra
note 17, at 3244; and Luft, et al., Specialized Clinical Services, supra note 17, at 83.
2

See Larry M. Manheim & Joe Feinglass, HospitalCost Incentives in a FragmentedHealth CareSystem, 19(1) HEALTH CARE
MGMT. REV. 56,56(1994); David Dranove, et al., Price and
Concentrationin HospitalMarkets: The Switchfrom PatientDriven to Payer-DrivenCompetition, 36 J. L. & ECON. 179,
179-181 (1993) [hereinafter Dranove et al., Payer-Driven
Competition]; Woolley & Frech, How Hospitals Compete,
supra note 17, at 60-61.
21 See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
MEDICINE 5 (1982); Mark A. Hall, Institutional Control of
PhysicianBehavior:Legal Barriersto Health CareCost Containment, 137 U. PA. L. Rev. 431,445-47 (1988).
2See Woolley & Frech, How HospitalsCompete, supra note 17,
at 59.
See Blumstein, Competing Visions, supra note 1,at 1463-1464.
54 Starr, supranote 21, at 226-27. Starr has argued that the dominance of professionals has perpetuated the imbalance in information available to patients, and thereby has perpetuated
professional power vis a vis patients. That is, professionalism may in part be a cause, not just a response, to market
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failure (the asymmetry of information between physician and
patient).
5 See Kenneth Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics
ofMedical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941,947-49 (1963). (arguing that the professional paradigm is a response to market
failure in the medical care marketplace - the unpredictable
nature of the need for medical care and the ignorance of the
consumer); Starr, supra note 21, at 226-27 (noting that uncertainty and consumer ignorance may be promoted by the
professional paradigm, thereby perpetuating the empowerment of professionals in medical care decisionmaking).
See Luft, et al., Specialized ClinicalServices, supra note 17,
at 83; Woolley & Frech, How Hospitals Compete, supra
note 17, at 60-61.
57See Luft, et al., Specialized ClinicalServices, supra note 17,
at 83.
See Dranove, et al., Payer-Driven Competition, supra note
20, at 180; Glenn A. Melnick, The Effects of Market Structure and BargainingPosition on HospitalPrices, Il J.HEALTH
ECON. 217, 231 (1992) [hereinafter Melnick, Market Structure and Bargaining Position]; James C. Robinson, HMO
Market Penetrationand Hospital Cost Inflation in California, 266 JAMA 2719, 2723 (1991) [hereinafter Robinson,
HMO Market Penetration];Zwanziger & Melnick, Competition and the MedicarePPS Program,supra note 17, at 316;
and Jack Zwanziger et al, Cost andPriceCompetition in California Hospitals, 1980-1990, 13 HEALTH AFF. 118, 124 (Fall
1994) [hereinafter Zwanziger et al., California Hospitals,
1980-1990].
"See Robinson & Luft, Competitionand Cost, supra note 17, at
3241.
' See id. at 3244; Zwanziger & Melnick, Hospital Competition
and the Medicare PPSProgram,supranote 17, at 305. For a
more generalized discussion of the relationship between the
nature of competition and the containment of costs, see Thomas L. Greaney, Managed Competition, IntegratedDelivery
Systems and Antitrust, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1507, 1513-14
(1994).
31See Luft, et al., Specialized ClinicalServices, supra note 17, at
92.
32
See Luft, et al., Specialized ClinicalServices, supra note 17, at
93; Robinson & Luft, Competition and Cost, supra note 17,
at 3241.
13See Luft, et al., Specialized ClinicalServices, supranote
17, at
91.
See generally Robert C. Clark, Does the Nonprofit Form Fit
the HospitalIndustry?, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1416 (1980); Philip
C. Kissam et al., Antitrust and Hospital Privileges: Testing
the Conventional Wisdom, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 595 (1982).
35
See Luft, et al., Specialized ClinicalServices, supra note 17, at
83. See also Hall, supra note 21, at 506.
36
See Luft, et al., Specialized ClinicalServices, supranote 17, at
93.
37
Robinson & Luft, HospitalMarket Structure, supranote 17, at
342. See also United States v. Carilion Health System, 707
F Supp. 840, 846 (W.D. Va. 1989).
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Critics of the use of markets in medical care often have relied
on those studies to suggest that the market for medical care
was different, that competition could not achieve its traditional objective of economic efficiency. See, e.g., Entin et
al., supra note I. As the later studies have shown, see infra
notes 50-54, and as current anecdotal experience is demonstrating, the market in medical care responds to incentives as
in other markets. Where, as in regulated industries, the terms
of competition are constrained, the consequences of competition may be socially ill-adaptive. The policy issue then becomes what policy pathway to pursue - give up on the market and impose a regulatory solution that substitutes for the
market, or improve the functioning of the market to create an
appropriate set of incentives.

39

See Robinson & Luft, Hospital Market Structure, supra note
17, at 354. An alternative explanation of the evidence might
be to focus on market conditions from the position of the
dominant physicians. In seemingly competitive markets,
conditions were advantageous to physicians upon whose referrals hospitals relied to fill patient beds. In effect, for the
physicians prices went down (or value of services went up).
In more concentrated markets, the margins available to physicians were recaptured by the hospitals, which had more
market leverage. From the perspective of physicians, prices
went up in those markets, as there was less surplus made available to referring physicians, upon whom such hospitals were
presumably less dependent.
'See infra notes 94, 95 and accompanying text.
4Health care costs rose sufficiently - both in terms of rate of
increase and absolute levels of expenditure - to attract serious employer attention. Employers became willing to confront the difficult employee-relationship issues involved in
changing or limiting an unconstrained fee-for-service system.
Insurance companies modified their range of options to accommodate employer concerns and to compete with HMOs.
Historically, physicians have resisted perceived inroads
on their professional autonomy by engaging in collective action. See, e.g., American Medical Ass'n v. United States,
317 U.S. 519 (1943) (holding a refusal by fee-for-service
physicians to deal with HMO physicians to be a violation of
the Sherman Act). At one time, there was some question about
the scope of antitrust applicability to professional activity.
See United States v. Oregon State Medical Society, 343 U.S.
326, 336 (1952) (stating that "forms of competition usual in
the business world may be demoralizing to the ethical standards of a profession"). Faced with this type of potential
collective resistance and the uncertain status of antitrust enforcement against such collective physician conduct, payers
were understandably reluctant to take aggressive cost-containment measures.
That the antitrust laws apply to professional activity
is now settled. National Society of Professional Engineers v.
United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). Collective action relating to fees,
even for purported reasons of improving professional quality, violates the antitrust laws. See FTC v. Superior Court
Trial Lawyers Ass'n., 493 U.S. 411 (1990) (holding that collective refusal of court-appointed trial lawyers in criminal
defenses cases to accept appointment because of low fee levels constituted a per se violation of the antitrust law). See
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also Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 U.S.
332 (1982) (holding maximum fee agreements among physicians, arranged by the Maricopa County Medical Society, to
be per se unlawful price fixing agreements); In re Michigan
State Medical Society, 101 FT.C. 191 (1983) (invalidating
physicians' collective conduct in negotiating with Blue Cross/
Blue Shield regarding the insurer's cost-containment efforts).
In a recent example, the Justice Department charged that hospitals in Danbury, Connecticut and St. Joseph, Missouri joined
with physicians in illegal price fixing schemes to keep out
lower-cost managed care companies. Both hospitals operated in monopoly situations. The cases were settled by consent decrees. See Thomas J. Lueck, Illegal Price-Fixing
Charged in Danbury Hospital Suit, N.Y. Times, Sept. 14,
1995, at B6. For further cases and discussion, see Greaney,
supra note 30, at 1524, and Meyer & Rule, supra note 1, at
183-86. These antitrust decisions have limited the ability of
physicians and physician organizations to resist competition
and inhibit the formation of innovative methods of providing
care and containing cost.
'2 See Glenn A. Melnick & Jack Zwanziger, Hospital Behavior
under Competition and Cost-Containment Policies: The California Experience, 1980 to 1985, 260 JAMA 2669, 2669
(1988) [hereinafter Melnick & Zwanziger, The California
Experience, 1980-85]; Robinson, HMO Market Penetration,
supra note 28, at 2719.
43See David Dranove & William D. White, Recent Theory and
Evidence on Competition in Hospital Markets, 3 J. EcON. &
MGMT. STRATEGY 169, 193-94 (1994); Melnick & Zwanziger,
The CaliforniaExperience, 1980 to 1985, supra note 42, at
2669; James C. Robinson & Harold S. Luft, Competition,
Regulation, and Hospital Costs, 1982 to 1986, 260 JAMA
2676, 2676 (1988) [hereinafter Robinson & Luft, Competition,Regulation, and HospitalCosts]; Robinson, HMO Market Penetration, supra note 28, at 2719; Zwanziger & Melnick,
Competition and the Medicare PPS Program, supra note 17,
at 316-17; Jack Zwanziger et al, HospitalsandAntitrust: Defining Markets, Setting Standards, 19 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y

L. 423, 424 (1994) [hereinafter Zwanziger et al., Defining Markets, Setting Standards]; Jack Zwanziger et al, California Hospitals, 1980-1990, supra note 28, at 123.
AND

"Social Security Amendments of 1983, § 42 U.S.C.A. 1395ww
(West 1992 and Supp. 1995).
' 5 Prior to the adoption of PPS, Medicare had reimbursed providers on the basis of their costs. Under cost-based reimbursement, there are no incentives to contain costs; increased costs
result in increased reimbursement. DRGs are specified conditions for which Medicare will pay a fixed amount based on
the average costs to treat the condition. If a hospital is able to
treat the condition for less than the average amount, the hospital may retain the amount. However, the hospital is at risk
for treatment costs above the DRG payment. For a description of the DRG system, see Kathryn G. Sophy, Comment,
Diagnosis Related Groups and the Price of Cost Containment, 2 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 305, 306-07 (1986)
and Judith R. Lave, The Impact of the Medicare Prospective
Payment System and Recommendations for Change, 7 YALE
J. ON REG. 499, 505-07 (1990).
'A Health Maintenance Organization ("HMO") provides comprehensive health services to a defined population, its enroll-
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ees, in return for a fixed payment per enrollee. There are several different organizational models for HMOs. The physicians who provide care to the enrollees may be employed by
one HMO and only have those HMO enrollees as their patients; alternatively, the physicians may have contractual relationships with one or more HMOs and may see only HMO
enrollees or may also see other patients. Some HMOs are
mixed models. Since payment to the HMO is fixed regardless of the medical care needed, the HMO has incentives to
use cost effective care. Thus HMOs try to reduce hospital
based care and specialist care through oversight and economic
incentives to providers and try to contract with providers who
offer cost effective care. Depending on the type of HMO,
enrollees may have to pay entirely or partially for care provided by providers other than HMOs; thus enrollees have great
incentives to use the HMO providers. This in turn gives
HMOs bargaining power with respect to providers regarding
price and quality. See Stephen S. Boochever, Health Mainte-

49

See Melnick & Zwanziger, The CaliforniaExperience, 19801985, supra note 42, at 2675; Robinson, HMO Market Penetration,supra note 28, at 2723; Dranove, et al., Payer-Driven
Competition, supra note 20, at 180-81. The rate of increase
in inpatient costs adjusted for inflation increased at an average rate of almost 5% in 1980-82 and decreased by almost
2% in the 1983-85 period. Melnick & Zwanziger, The California Experience, 1980 to 1985, supra note 42, at 2672.

5

°Melnick & Zwanziger, The CaliforniaExperience, 1980 -1985,
supra note 42, at 2669.
5
1 Id. at 2670.
52
ld. at 2672.
53

1 d. at 2673.
See Robinson, HMO Market Penetration,supra note 28, at
2723. However, the cost reductions achieved (9.4% lower
rate of inflation) are to be contrasted with the rate of cost
increase per admission during the period (74.5%).

nance Organizationsin ALTERNATIVE DELIVERY SYSTEMS:

HMO's, PPO's AND CMPs (Jeanie M. Johnson, ed. 1986);
John F. Shields et al., The Cost of LegislativeRestrictionson
ContractingPractices:The Cost to Government, Employers
and Families, Lewin-VHI, Inc., Report to Healthcare Leadership Council, Alliance for Managed Care, and Health Insurance Association of America, ii-iii (June 21, 1995);
Lawrence P. Casalino, Balancing Incentives: How Should
PhysiciansBe Reimbursed?, 267 JAMA 403,404 (1992); and
Daniel K. Zismer, PhysicianIncentives in a Managed Care
World, 37 HEALTHCARE F.J. 39 (Sept.Oct. 1994).
4 A Preferred Provider Organization ("PPO") is a discounted
fee-for-service system with varying degrees of treatment oversight with regard to hospital and specialist use. Providers in
the PPO agree to discount the services they provide to a designated population. If those persons insured under a PPO do
not use the designated PPO providers, they are required to
pay higher co-payments. Providers in a PPO have incentives
to provide efficient care because of the discount; however,
they also have incentives to increase the volume of care provided. The higher co-payment which PPO insureds are required to pay to non-PPO providers gives the insureds incentives to use PPO providers. This control of patient behavior
gives PPOs the ability to bargain with their providers regarding price and quality. See Michael F Anthony, PreferredProvider Organizations in ALTERNATIVE DELIVERY SYSTEMS:
HMO's, PPO's AND CMP's (Jeanie M. Johnson, ed. 1986);
Shields, supra note 46, at ii-iii; Casalino, supra note 46, at
403; Zismer, supra note 46, at 39.
4

See Melnick & Zwanziger, The California Experience 19801985, supra note 42, at 2670. The Federal Health Maintenance Act of 1973 preempts state laws that inhibit or prevent
the formation of HMOs. See 42 USC § 300e-10 (1988).
Some state HMO legislation expands the federal legislation
and enables HMOs to employ physicians rather than to contract with a professional corporation of physicians to provide services. Additionally, state HMO legislation allowed
business corporations to form HMOs. See, e.g., TENN. CODE
ANN. § 56-32-201 to 225 (1994). Although HMOs existed
prior to the adoption of the 1973 federal legislation, the federal law (as amended) enabled and stimulated the formation
of HMOs, which were organized to compete on the basis of
price as well as quality.
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See Dranove, et al., Payer-Driven Competition,supra note 20,
at 179 and 182; Melnick, Market Structure and Bargaining
Position, supra note 28, at 231-32; Ron Winslow, Is Victory
in Sight in Health-CareWar?, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 1995, at
I (attributing a 1.1%drop in average costs per employee from
a Foster Higgins survey of employers' shifts to enrollment in
managed care plans); Zwanziger & Melnick, Competitionand
the Medicare PPS Program, supra note 17, at 316; Zwanziger
et al., CaliforniaHospitals,1980-1990, supra note 28, at 123;
Zwanziger et al., Defining Markets, Setting Standards,supra
note 43, at 429; and Shields, supra note 46, at iv. For recent
data on health care cost reductions in California see Alain C.
Enthoven and Sara J. Singer, Managed Competition in the
California Health Care Economy, 14 HEALTH AFF. (Winter
1995).

' Under traditional health insurance plans, patients do not have
the same motivation to be cost conscious. In the absence of
substantial deductibles and copayments, patients face little
incentive to be cost conscious. Even with co-payments, there
is the phenomenon of moral hazard, since patients' co-payments typically amount to 20% of expenses. The divergence
between individual cost and actual social cost in such circumstances is graphically depicted in Clark C. Havighurst &
James F. Blumstein, Coping with Quality/Cost Trade-offs in
Medical Care:The Role of PSROs, 70 Nw. U. L. REV. 6, 1718 (1975).
Under traditional fee-for-service payment practices,
physicians' economic incentives are aligned with their professional perception that more is better in medical care. Economic incentives for cost constraints are therefore similarly
lacking.
57
See Dranove, et al.,Payer-Driven Competition,supra note 20,
at 183; Zwanziger et al., California Hospitals, 1980-1990,
supra note 28, at 120; Zwanziger et al., Defining Markets,
Setting Standards, supranote 43, at 427-29. A study of data
from California from 1983 to 1988 concluded that under the
influence of a payer-driven market, margins, measured using
the bargained-for price rather than the list price, were falling
in competitive markets. See Dranove, et al., Payer-Driven
Competition, supranote 20, at 201. California hospitals with
more than ten other hospitals within a fifteen mile radius had
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an adjusted inflation rate of 40.5%; California hospitals with
fewer than ten hospitals within a fifteen mile radius had an
adjusted inflation rate of 62.0%; the adjusted rate in the 43
other states was 58.4%. See Robinson & Luft, Competition,
Regulation, and HospitalCosts, supra note 43, at 2679. Another study examined hospital selective contracting by the
Blue Cross PPO in California and showed that the PPO was
able to secure lower prices for its patients in competitive
markets. See Melnick, Market Structure and Bargaining Position, supra note 28, at 229, 23 1.
58

See Blumstein, Competing Visions, supra note i, at 1463-1474.

9See Robinson & Luft, Competition and Cost, supra note 17,
at 3241.
See Zwanziger et al., Defining Markets, Setting Standards,
supra note 43, at 442-44; and Zwanziger et al., California
Hospitals, 1980-1990, supra note 28, at 125.
61 See Zwanziger et al., Defining Markets, Setting Standards,
supra note 43, at 423.
2 See Meyer & Rule, supra note 1, at 182-220.
6 See U.S. Dept. Of Justice and Federal Trade Comm'n, Statements of Enforcement Policy and Analytical Principles Relating to Health Careand Antitrust (Sept. 27, 1994), supra
note 14; Commissioner Christine Varney, New Directions at
the FTC: Efficiency Justifications in Hospital Mergers and
Vertical Integration Concerns, (Remarks Before the Health
Care Antitrust Forum (May 2, 1995) (stating that, as a matter
of prosecutorial discretion, the FTC should emphasize efficiency justifications in examining hospital mergers, and that
such a focus would likely result in fewer challenges to mergers)). For discussion, see 4 HEALTH L. REP. 681 (1995).
64317 U.S. 341, 352 (1943).
See, e.g., Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425
U.S. 738, 743 n.2 (1976).
' Parker, 317 U.S. at 351 ("In a dual system of government in
which, under the Constitution, the states are sovereign, save
only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from their
authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control
over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to
Congress.").
67See Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of
Federalism, 26 J. L. & EcON. 23, 25 (1983). But see Einer
Richard Elhauge, The Scope ofAntitrust Process, 104 HARv.
L. REV. 667, 717-29 (1991) (critiquing this view of the stateaction doctrine).
IFTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 112S. Ct. 2169, 2176 (1992).
6

9Califomia Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n. v. Midcal Aluminum,
Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980).

7

Parker, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).

"The raisin proration scheme was a clear effort by California
"to substitute sales quotas and price control - the purest form
of economic regulation - for competition in the market for
California raisins." See Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 388 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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2

Parker, 317 U.S. at 352.
350-51.
74Columbia, 499 U.S. at 370.
73ld. at

5
7 California

Liquor DealersAssn. v. MidcalAluminum, Inc., 445
U.S. 97 (1980).
76At one point, it was not clear whether state-action immunity
could be conferred by a state on a private party. See Cantor v.
Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 585-92 (1976) (plurality).
Justice Stevens, for a plurality of four justices (Stevens,
Brennan, Marshall, and White), concluded that Parker immunity could only be extended to state officials in their official capacities. Id. at 591. The Solicitor General advocated
that position, id. at 588-89, but it has not prevailed. See Patrick
v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94,99-100 (1988) (stating that the Parker
doctrine can immunize private parties in appropriate situations). Thus, Parker immunity applies to private, as well as
governmental defendants, see Southern Motor Carriers Rate
Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48 (1985).
"7Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105, quoting City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410 (1978).
78Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 61.

79Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105, quoting City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410 (1978).
State officials must "have and [actually] exercise" the power
"to review particular anticompetitive acts of private parties
and disapprove those that fail to accord with state policy."
Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 101 (1988). Passive ratification of private anticompetitive conduct by government is insufficient.
8, "The mere potential for state supervision is not an adequate
substitute for a decision by the State. In the absence of active
supervision in fact, there can be no state-action immunity for
what were otherwise private price fixing arrangements." FTC
v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 112 S. Ct. 2169, 2179 (1992).
80

The "active supervision" requirement serves "essentially the
evidentiary function of ensuring that the actor is engaging in
the challenged conduct pursuant to state policy." Town of
Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 46 (1985).
83
Id. at 47. Where the actor is a municipality, "there is little or
no [such] danger" and therefore no "active supervision" requirement. Id. Thus local government health care providers
such as municipal hospitals may need only show a clearly
articulated policy to replace competition with regulation (and
not active supervision) for them to be within the state-action
immunity doctrine.
"Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 101 (1988).
s5 7icor, 112 S. Ct. at 2177.
RId.
87

Id. at 2178.

sId.
89

1d. at 2176.
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"Id. at 2177.
9' Id. at 2179-80.
92Patrick, 486 U.S. at 100.
93 See Sarah S. Vance, Immunity for Provider Collaboration, 62
ANTITRUST L.J. 409, 421-423 (1994).

9The General Accounting Office identified eighteen states that
had enacted some form of provider cooperation legislation as
of May 1994. See U.S. General Accounting Office, Health
Care: Federal and State Antitrust Actions Concerning the
Health Care Industry, at 12 (August 1994). Wyoming has
enacted provider cooperation legislation in 1995.
95

See infra Table I, Hospital Operation Laws.

'Parker, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).

'TENN.

CODE ANN.

98TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 68-11-1302(2) (1994).
§ 68-11-1308 and 1309.

99 TENN. CODE ANN.

"°TENN.CODE
01

ANN.

TENN. CODE ANN.

t01TENN. CODE ANN.
3

1° TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 68-11-1303(a).
§ 68-11 - 1303(b).
§ 68-11-1303(c) and (d).
§ 68-11-1303(d)(1) and (2).

§ 68-11-1303(e).

CODE ANN. § 68-11-1303(f) (with respect to the health
department); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-1 1-1305 (with respect to
the state attorney general).

"TENN.

supra text accompanying notes 66 & 67. See also 7?cor,
112 S.Ct. at 2176 ("[F]ederal antitrust laws are subject to supersession by state regulatory programs.").

105See

" TENN.
07

CODE ANN.

1 See TENN.

the FTC and the DOJ will not challenge a merger of two
hospitals if one of the hospitals is more than four years old
and during the last three years has had an average of fewer
than 100 licensed beds and an average daily census of fewer
than 40 patients. If a merger is outside the safety zone, the
agencies will consider whether competitors remain post
merger, whether cost savings will be realized, and whether a
failing hospital is involved.
1
' Minn. Memo, supra note 114, at 9.
117
Id.
118
Id.
" 9 Id. at 23.

'20Id. at 10.
2 It is unclear whether the antitrust laws would have barred a
pro-competitive merger in any event. However, without a
state process that provides assurance, and in the absence of
compliance with DOJ/FTC antitrust enforcement safety zone,
the merger might not have taken place as a practical matter
because of the risk stemming from legal uncertainty.
22 Some analysts of the Minnesota hospital merger were skeptical of the consumer benefits. See Roger Feldman, Huge
Health Care Mergers Bode Ill, MNPLS. STAR TRIB., August 8,
1992 atA2. For an analysis of the Greater Minneapolis HMO
market and the conclusion that competition leads to lower
HMO premiums, see Douglas Wholey, Roger Feldman, &
Jon B. Christiansen, The Effect of Market Structure on HMO
Premiums, 14 JOURNAL OF HEALTH ECONS. 81 (1995); Roger
Feldman, The Welfare Economics of a Health Plan Merger, 6
JOURNAL OF REGULATORY ECONOMICS 67 (1994).

§ 68-1I - 1306(a).

CODE ANN.

§§ 68-11-1303 and 1306.

17icor, 112 S.Ct. at 2177 quoting Patrick, 486 U.S. at 100101.
19 Proposed Tenn. Dept. of Health, Rules and Regulations Goveming the Hospital Cooperation Act of 1993, 1200-24-5-.05.
""Ticor, 112 S.Ct. at 2179.
'Id. at 2179-80.
112 Id.
"

3

12

Three other states have used their provider cooperation process. Maine has approved an agreement among three hospitals for the joint operation of a magnetic resonance imaging
machine; Oregon has approved ajoint kidney transplant program between two hospitals; and Washington has allowed
eight rural hospitals to send nonemergency laboratory work
to a central laboratory. See U.S. General Accounting Office,
Health Care: Federal and State Antitrust Actions Concerning the Health Care Industry, at I I (August 1994).

i Findings of Fact, Conclusions, Order and Memorandum issued by Minnesota Commissioner of Health, IN RE APPLICATION OF HEALTHSPAN HEALTH SYSTEMS CORPORATION (July 22,
1994) [hereinafter Minn. Memo].
""See infra text accompanying notes 121 & 122. The merger
safety zone provides that absent extraordinary circumstances

1995-1996

One speculative hypothesis regarding the Minneapolis hospital merger is that the large purchasers with clout in
the market were content to accept an arrangement that resulted in lower prices for them, while leaving open the possibility of the merged hospitals using their increased leverage
to extract higher prices from less well organized purchasers
of services. Widely dispersed consumer interests would not
necessarily find their interest served by the costly participation in an administrative/regulatory proceeding. That type of
participation, with its attendant costs in legal and economic
expert fees, has a public good aspect. Theory would suggest
that such an expense will be unlikely to be borne by a single
small market participant.
See Entin, supra note 1, at 118-20. See also Nguyen Xuan
Nguyen & Frederick W. Derrick, Hospital Markets and Competition: Implications for Antitrust Policy, 19 HEALTH CARE
MGMT. REV. 35 (1994).

24

' The agencies also may have wanted to avoid having a major
industry slip out from under antitrust scrutiny if all states
passed hospital cooperation laws and, consistent with the requirements of state-action immunity doctrine, liberally applied them.
125See Meyer & Rule, supra note 1, at 171. ("[Tlthe sweeping
calls for antitrust immunities amount to the proverbial 'throwing the baby out with the bath water' ... [Tlhe federal antitrust laws ... provide a great degree of flexibility for private
collaborative efforts aimed at achieving more efficient and

Feature Articles * 115

M3
Ticor, 112 S.Ct. at 2177 ("Immunity is conferred out of reless costly delivery of health care services.").
spect for ongoing regulation by the State, not out of respect
11The hassle in complying with state provider cooperation laws
for the economics of price restraint.").
comes from the detailed presentation that must be made as
486 U.S. at 101.
"
Patrick,
part of the state's review process. In the absence of a serious
and substantive review process, the state provider coopera'Ticor, 112 S. Ct. at 2176.
tion laws will not succeed in conferring antitrust immunity
'Patrick, 486 U.S. at 101.
joint
conduct.
in
the
involved
parties
on the private
34
' 71cor, 112 S. Ct. at 2177.
'17The uncertainty regarding immunity conferred by hospital
cooperation legislation derives from the need, in order to '3 The statutory requirements for ongoing, active supervision
establish Parker-immunity, for active and ongoing state suvary significantly. In Colorado, annual reports are required
pervision. The state's issuance of a certificate of public adby CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-32-2708 (West 1994); in
vantage will only be effective as a shield from antitrust enFlorida agency review is required every two years by FLA.
forcement if the state in fact fulfills its supervision responsiSTAT. ANN. § 395.606(3) (West 1995); in Georgia there are
bility.
no supervision provisions; in Idaho the attorney general may
28In the first case settled since the guidelines were published,
request updates by IDAHO CODE § 39-4903(8) (1995) and is
required to supervise by § 39-4903(10); in Kansas there is
the Department of Justice, the Florida Attorney General's
annual review by the health department required by KAN.
office, and two voluntary hospital systems in the St. PetersSTAT. ANN. § 65-4958 (1994); in Maine there are no superviburg area agreed to a partnership arrangement, but not a
sion provisions; in Minnesota the Health Department supermerger. That allowed the hospitals to provide services jointly
vises the agreements by MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62J.2920 (West
in areas where there are numerous competitors such as some
1995); in Montana there are no supervision provisions; in
outpatient services, open heart surgery, laboratory and diagNebraska annual reports are required by NEB. REV. STAT. §
nostic services, some specialized high technology services,
71-7708 (1994); in New York there are no supervision proviand others. Additionally, the hospitals were allowed to consions; in North Carolina periodic reports with specified insolidate administrative services such as accounting, commuformation are required by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131E-192.9
nications, medical staff organization, and medical record keep(1994); in North Dakota there are no supervision provisions;
ing. By allowing joint ventures in specialized tertiary care
in Ohio the Health Department may request updates by OHIO
services that compete over a larger geographic market, the
REV. CODE ANN. § 3727.22(D) (Baldwin 1995); in Oregon
agreement has the potential for reducing costs by increasing
annual reports are required by OR. REV. STAT. § 442.725
utilization and may improve outcomes by permitting the same
(1994); in Tennessee the Attorney General is entrusted with
personnel to work together more frequently. The agreement
oversight without further specification by TENN. CODE ANN.
did not allow the two systems to discuss managed care con§ 68-11 - 1303(b) (1994); inTexas documents may be requested
tracting, pricing or marketing. See Landmark Federal-State
by TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 313.004(b) (West
Settlement Clears Way for Innovative Partnership, 3 HEALTH
1995); in Washington annual reports are required by WASH.
L. REP. 830, 830-31 (1994).
REV. CODE ANN. § 43.72.310(6) (West 1995); in Wisconsin
Similarly, the Department of Justice in a business rethere are no supervision provisions; and in Wyoming annual
view letter declined to challenge under antitrust law a proreports are required by Wyo. STAT. § 35-24-114(b) (1995).
posed plan by businesses and health care providers in BirThe Kansas and Washington statutes, which are limited to
to
evaluproject
a
demonstration
to
develop
mingham, Ala.,
rural areas, have no supervision requirement.
ate certain health care services provided by area hospitals.
Ticor, 112 S.Ct. at 2180 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at
36See
The project called for the hospitals to submit data about the
2182 and 2183-84 (dissents).
clinical effectiveness and cost of three types of health care
services. The information will be collected by an indepen- '"For example, are the savings being passed through to condent corporation and evaluated. See Justice DepartmentWon't
sumers? If those savings are being used for cross-subsidizaChallenge Health Care Demonstration Project, 3 HEALTH L.
tion, what priorities are being pursued? Presumably, the suREP. 831,831 (1994).
pervisory state agency would have to review and adopt as its
own the targets of cross-subsidization to satisfy the active
" Patrick, 486 U.S. at 1OI, "The mere presence of some state
supervision requirement.
involvement or monitoring does not suffice.... The active su3
pervision prong of the Midcal test requires that state officials
agencies do not promise to respond in any specified time
'
The
have and exercise power to review particular anticompetitive
period to requests which involve mergers outside the safety
acts of private parties and disapprove those that fail to accord
zone. They promise to respond within 120 days to requests
with state policy. Absent such a program of supervision, there
regarding multiprovider networks. For other situations they
is no realistic assurance that a private party's anticompetitive
promise to respond within 90 days. See U.S. Department of
party's
conduct promotes state policy, rather than merely the
Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Statements ofEnforceindividual interests." 7icor, 112 S.Ct. at 2176-77. "Actual
ment Policy andAnalyticalPrinciplesRelating to Health Care
is the precondition for immunity from
state involvement ...
and Antitrust, (1994), supra note 14.
federal law." Id. at 2179. "The mere potential for state su3
pervision is not an adequate substitute for a decision by the '" See supra text accompanying notes 55-57.
State.... In the absence of active supervision in fact, there can "See supra note 48. HMO enrollment in 1993 was more than
be no state-action immunity for what were otherwise private
45 million and PPO enrollment was 76.6 million, while in
price fixing arrangements." Id.
6
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1987 enrollment was 29.3 million and 12.2 million respectively. See Barbara Weiss, Managed Care: There's No Stopping It Now, 72 MEDICAL ECON. 26, 26 (March 13, 1995).
Estimates for 1995 are that 30% of the private group market
will be in HMOs, 35% in PPOs and POSs, 30% in managed
fee-for-service, and only 5% in unmanaged fee-for-service.
See Shields et al., The Cost of Legislative Restrictions on
Contracting Practices: The Cost to Governments, Employers and Families, supranote 46, at 9-10.
41
' See Zwanziger et al., CaliforniaHospitals, 1980-1990, supra
note 28, at 125; Zwanziger et al., Defining Markets, Setting
Standards, supra note 43, at 442-43.
' 42Entin, supra note I, at 122-138.
43
1 See supra in note 57 (listing studies). See also Robert H.
Miller
& Harold S. Luft, Managed Care Plan Performance Since
1980, 271 JAMA 1512 (1994).
See Ron Winslow, Welfare Recipients Are a Hot Commodity
in Managed Care Now, WALL ST. J., April 12, 1995, at AI.
See also George Anders & Laurie McGinley, Managed
Eldercare: HMOs Are Signing Up New Class of Member:
The Group in Medicare,WALL ST. J., April 27, 1995, at Al.
"' "Patient deaths are 8% lower and hospital costs are 11.5%
lower than expected in cities with a high penetration of managed care, the survey of 1,300 U.S. hospitals showed." See
KPMG Peat Marwick, KPMG Study: Managed Care May
Be Beneficial to Your Health and Your Pocketbook (1993).
(Copies available by calling Debbie Dalmand at 714/850-

1995-1996

4440) See also Mumtaz A. Siddiqui et al., Insurance-Related Differences in the Risk ofRuptured Appendix, 331 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 332 (1995) (showing patients with HMO coverage had fewer ruptured appendixes than patients with feefor-service coverage); Arnold S. Relman, Medical Insurance
and Health, 331 NEW ENG. J. MED. 471 (1994).
"4Seegenerally Wholey, Feldman & Christiansen, The Effect of
Market Structure on HMO Premiums, supra note 122.
47

See MICHAELA. MORRISEY, COST SHIFTING IN

HEALTH CARE: SEPA-

RHEToRIc (1994) (questioning cost-shifting as a long-term strategy); Charles E. Phelps, Cross-Subsidies and Charge Shifting in American Hospitals, in UNCOMRATING EVIDENCE FROM

PENSATED HOSPITAL CARE: RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

108

(Frank A. Sloan et al. eds., 1986).
1"See Blumstein, Competing Visions, supra note 1,at 1498-1501.
149Id.

"5Seesupra i text accompanying notes 102, 103, 107-111 (summarizing Tennessee's benefits and disadvantages, which are
representative of those of other statutes).
...
See Blumstein, Competing Visions, supra note 1, at 1501.
52
See Feldman, Huge Health CareMergers Bode Ill, supranote
122.
153 Two Boston Hospitals Merge to Reduce Costs, Overcapacity,
2 Health L. Rep. 1647 (1993).
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